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I. Introduction  
On June 25, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its decision in 
Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder1 the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”)2 case in 
which an Alabama county found to have violated the Act in 20083 sought to 
avoid the Act’s application by making a facial challenge to the preclearance 
requirement for changes in voting that might limit the right to vote based on 
suspect categories.4  The majority opinion in the 5-4 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, finding that preclearance requirement to be unconstitutional, 
focused on equal treatment under the Constitution, and used a disparate 
treatment analysis in reviewing the constitutionality of a duly passed 
legislative act.5   
 
Unfortunately for supporters of a strong Voting Rights Act, the equal 
treatment sought by the Court’s majority was not of people, but of States, and 
the disparate treatment found problematic was the requirement that some 
States receive federal approval for changes to electoral rules under the 1975 
review of State acts in violation of the VRA.6  In order to protect the equal  
*Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law, J.D. Columbia Law School, 
1999.  A.B. Princeton University, 1996. 
1 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). 
2 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-6 (1965). 
3 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
4 The U.S. Department of Justice has noted that preclearance requires “proof that the proposed 
voting change does not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership 
in a language minority group. If the jurisdiction is unable to prove the absence of such 
discrimination, the District Court denies the requested judgment, or in the case of administrative 
submissions, the Attorney General objects to the change, and it remains legally unenforceable.”  
See Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Section 5 Resource Guide, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php , (last visited by author March 18, 2014). 
5 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2623-24. 
6 The Court points to nationwide bans on tests and devices to limit the franchise in 1970 (see 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 314), as well as the 1975 reauthorization that 
looked at voter registration and turnout as of 1972, expanded the VRA to forbid voting 
discrimination on the basis of membership in a language minority group, and made the 
discrimination on the basis of membership in a language minority group, and made the 
nationwide ban on tests and devices permanent.  See Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2637.  200  
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sovereignty of States, therefore, the decision requires a Congressional finding 
that the States required to seek preclearance require greater supervision 
today for the limited purposes for which preclearance is needed – the 
protection of the franchise from blatant discrimination, discrimination of 
sufficient gravity that the extreme recourse to federal authority is 
warranted.7   
 
This reading of the Voting Rights Act makes a number of tacit and 
explicit assumptions with regard to the choice, by the Federal Government 
and by the States, of whose rights governmental actors must protect.  The 
majority does so, in part, by decontextualizing the Civil Rights movement 
and the Voting Rights Act from decolonization and post-World War II 
expressions of human rights, a time in which there was a move toward 
greater global recognition that the “other” has rights that are enforceable 
based on recognition of individual human equality.8    
 
7 See Shelby, 133 S.Ct. at 2615 (“the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current 
needs,” quoting dicta from Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 
193, 203 (2009)).  Justice Ginsburg’s vigorous dissent in Shelby focused on the fact that Congress 
had, prior to its 2006 reauthorization of the VRA, exerted considerable effort in determining that 
the preclearance requirement was necessary and justified.  See Shelby, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), 
133 S. Ct. 2612 at 2632, slip op. at 12-30.  
8 See e.g., U.N. CHARTER, Art. 1: “The Purposes of the United Nations are: … (2): To develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 
(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion…” 
(Oct. 24, 1945); UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), on equality of persons: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 
Article I   
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.   
Article 2   
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.   
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
And on voting:  
Article 21      
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.   
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.   
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections, which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.   
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One way in which the Supreme Court has made such 
decontextualization easier for itself is in looking for clarity from the other 
branches of government before applying legal standards, which often allows 
for consideration of only domestic norms.  This is particularly the case where 
standards might otherwise arise from or connect with foreign relations.9  The 
Court has recently called for Congress to clarify its reasons for adopting 
international norms for human rights issues—action that the Court finds 
extraordinary--thereby creating a limitation on the scope of rights-promoting 
legislation (Shelby) and its enforcement of rights in U.S. courts (Medellín, 
Kiobel). 
 
By putting the Voting Rights Act into the context of human rights 
instruments, we can see as appropriate a call for positive rights – for the 
Federal Government to take positive stances to provide protections to 
members of groups that have, historically and through the present day, faced 
special challenges in having their voices heard, even as against a State that 
does not currently act with intent to harm that population. 
 
In this symposium Essay, I first consider the context of the Fifteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, and its work in overturning prior 
jurisprudence that indicated a divorcing of constitutional protections from the 
African-American population.  I then turn to the context of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 and the connection between U.S. right-protective legislation and 
a global shift toward rights-protective treaties and laws.  I then juxtapose the 
positivist stance of international law with the current Court’s jurisprudential 
posture of seeking congressional clarification and justification of rights above 
all else, even in the context of civil and human rights.  Finally, I conclude 
that without the positivist interpretations that have permeated U.S. civil 
rights legislation and jurisprudence in the past, new voting rights legislation 
can achieve neither its domestic nor global potential. 
 
 
 
 
9 See e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1373 (2008) (noting the Court’s 
inability to enforce a decision of the International Court of Justice based on the United States 
political branches having decided to “undertake” to comply with judgments of the ICJ, but 
effectively not being bound by decisions of the ICJ; and 128 S.Ct. at 1369 (“the terms of a non-self-
executing treaty can become domestic law only in the same way as any other law—through 
passage of legislation by both Houses of Congress, combined with either the President’s signature 
or a congressional override of a Presidential veto. See Art. I, § 7.”); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 133 S.Ct 1659 (2013) (“the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct 
of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS [Alien Tort Statute], because the question 
is not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”). 202  
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1. The Fifteenth Amendment 
 
  Following the Civil War, the widespread belief that the law had to shift 
dramatically to affirmatively protect the franchise for former slaves allowed 
for the passage and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. The Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress tremendous power to 
fashion appropriate legislation to enforce this principle: “The right of citizens 
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.” 10  Read in conjunction with the 10th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, 11  recognizing that powers not accorded to the Federal 
Government are reserved to the States, or the people, we recognize that the 
Civil War Amendments – the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
amendments – recognize rights in the people, limiting the rights of the 
federal and State governments to abridge popular rights remaining to the 
individual citizen. 12   In recognizing the delegation of authority for the 
protection of peoples historically excluded from State protections, the 
Supreme Court stated in 1879: 
 
It is the power of Congress which been enlarged Congress is authorized 
to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation.  Some legislation 
is contemplated to make the [Civil War] amendments fully effective.13 
 
10 U.S. Const., Amend. XV.  The Fifteenth Amendment may also be read in the context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, which notes that no state may “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const., Amend. XIV § 1. 
11 U.S. Const., Amend. X: “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
12 With regard to the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court specifically recognized the right of 
Congress to protect persons ahead of the interests of States of the Union, both as the Federal 
Government might act as “the ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen” (South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)) and through the enlargement of powers under the Civil 
War Amendments allowing for unequal treatment of States to remedy “local evils which have 
subsequently appeared” following admission of States to the Union.  Id. at 328-29.  Thus, in 
prohibiting state legislation that might adversely impact those previously discriminated against 
without requiring proof of state intent, “Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time 
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims,” when protecting individuals from 
state-sanctioned discrimination pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment.  Id. at 327-28.  This was 
part of an expanded power extended to Congress under the Constitution to enforce the Civil War 
Amendments.  The Supreme Court recognized that Congress could implement: “Whatever 
legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, 
whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons 
the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State 
denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.”  Id. at 
326-27 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)). 
13 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879). 203  
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This recognition of the right of the individual was particularly 
important, as it baldly rejected a persistent line of thought in some quarters, 
and stated by the Supreme Court, that the Constitution protected those who 
entered the polity through the State governments,14 and, thus, recognized the 
sovereign right of the State governments to exclude from citizenship those 
not intended by the Constitution to form part of the polity of the United 
States.  The Fifteenth Amendment dispelled that view of the Constitution’s 
limited protection, specifically restricting the ability of the Federal and State 
governments to withhold the voting franchise based their originalist 
interpretations of the Constitution that would exclude those of African 
descent from membership in the Federal and State polity, and, therefore, 
deprive those persons of the protections of the Constitution.  To some extent, 
the Civil War Amendments were aspirational – that is, while they purported 
to afford the rights of citizenship to African-Americans, State mechanisms 
could be exercised to effectively prevent the exercise of the franchise, and, 
thereby, the enforcement of the laws, notwithstanding the prohibition on the 
“enforce[ment of] any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
14 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 447-48 (1857): 
The principle upon which our Governments rest, and upon which alone they continue to 
exist, is the union of States, sovereign and independent within their own limits in their 
internal and domestic concerns, and bound together as one people by a General 
Government, possessing certain enumerated and restricted powers, delegated to it by the 
people of the several States, and exercising supreme authority within the scope of the 
powers granted to it, throughout the dominion of the United States. … Whatever it 
acquires, it acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States who created it. It is 
their trustee acting for them, and charged with the duty of promoting the interests of the 
whole people of the Union in the exercise of the powers specifically granted.”   
However, as noted earlier in the decision, the understanding of the make-up of the people of the 
Union created a limited polity:  
“The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean 
the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican 
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government 
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ 
and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The 
question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement 
[those descended from slaves of African descent] compose a portion of this people, and are 
constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not 
included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the 
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges, which that 
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, 
they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had 
been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained 
subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the 
power and the Government might choose to grant them.” 
   
Id. at 404-05. 204  
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citizens of the United States.” 15   It is for this reason that the effective 
protection of those rights defines not only the extent of their recognition by 
the Federal and State governments, but also the existence of personhood and 
participation in the sovereignty of the United States for those historically 
excluded.   
 
The Fifteenth amendment’s perspective on protection of the previously 
disenfranchised was aspirational and positivist, and those aspirations were 
held in abeyance during a century of Jim Crow legislation and practices.  It 
was only with the rise of a post-World War II global human rights movement 
that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 began the project of effectuating the 
promise of the Fifteenth Amendment—of recognizing African-Americans as 
“people of the United States.” 
 
2. The Global Context of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
 
In placing the Voting Rights Act within the context of the post-World 
War II upheaval in response to claims of ethnic superiorities, the question of 
an individual protection in response to a majoritarian (or other recognized 
power) denial of rights becomes paramount.  Put differently, the overturning 
of the racial stratification in the Civil War Amendments became a worldwide 
phenomenon in the response to Nazism in Europe, and the recognition of 
independence of former colonial holdings in the Middle East, Asia, and 
Africa, and in the question of capitalism versus socialism in the domination of 
South America. 
 
The 1950’s and 1960’s were a period in which the international 
community worked to enumerate some of the standards and laws protecting 
human rights, and to move from a period of aspirational/moral obligations 
(which some countries recognized as binding) to legal obligations that could 
not be ignored, even by those less desirous of their recognition.  Following 
conventions against discrimination in employment by the International 
Labour Organization in 1958 16  and in education by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1960, 17  the United 
Nations General Assembly passed the International Convention on the 
15 See U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.  The majority in Shelby noted that “[t]he first century of 
congressional enforcement of the [Fifteenth] Amendment, however, can only be regarded as a 
failure.”  See 133 S.Ct. 2612, at 2619, citing Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 197. 
16 International Labour Organization, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 
1958 (No. 111). 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C111 
17 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention against 
Discrimination in Education (adopted December 1960), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev. 
php-url_ID=12949&url_Do=Do_TOPIC8 url_Section=201.html. 205  
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  (CERD) in 196518 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966.19  Both 
these international conventions recognize the protection of individuals by 
their national governments. 
 
CERD looks to avoid racial discrimination, defined as “any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life.”20 The ICCPR seeks to protect rights “without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”21  Both 
these provisions describe a form of equal protection of the law, similar to that 
provided through Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment. 22  
Both CERD and the ICCPR specifically recognize a right to representation in 
the public sphere with certain protections based on race, ethnicity, or 
language, among other categories.23  Both of these Conventions (CERD and 
the ICCPR) were ratified by the United States, and were to be carried out by 
the Federal Government where the Federal Government has jurisdiction, or 
by the State government.24  The governmental actors might carry out the 
18 UN General Assembly Resolution 2106 (adopted December 1965). 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx. 
19 UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (adopted December 1966), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev. php- url_ID=12949&url_DO-DO_TOPIC8   
url_ SECTION=201.html.  http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx. 
20 CERD, Art. 1(1). 
21 ICCPR Art. 1. 
22 U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.” 
23 See e.g., ICCPR ARTS. 2, 3, 26, and 27; CERD ARTS. 1, 2, 3, and 5(c). 
24 See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: Understandings of the United 
States, noting, as of the U.S. ratification in 1992, “(1) That the Constitution and laws of the 
United States guarantee all persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections 
against discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based upon race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or any other 
status - as those terms are used in article 2, paragraph 1 and article 26 - to be permitted when 
such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective…. (5) 
That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal 
Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters 
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that state and 
local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take 
measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the state 
or local governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.”  206  
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obligations through new law or existing law, but, per the understanding of 
the United States, neither Convention was self-executing, meaning that the 
U.S. understanding of those Conventions was and is susceptible to judicial 
application and interpretation without action by the political branches.25   
 
Of course, this notion of courts finding legal obligations based on 
positive rights conflicts with the case and controversy reading typical of U.S. 
judicial practice – that our courts decide only what is before them, and look at 
the application of the law as provided by a legislature in the context of the 
particular controversy.26  For that reason, recognition of certain declarations 
of the U.N. General Assembly as indicative of State obligations under the 
U.N. Charter by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1980 
suggested a change. 
 
In Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, the Second Circuit noted with approval that 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,27 perhaps the most celebrated 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en .  See also INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS 
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, Reservations and Understandings at Ratification (1994), recognizing 
“[t]hat the Constitution and laws of the United States establish extensive protections against 
discrimination,” and “[t]hat the United States understands that this Convention shall be 
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the 
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments. To the extent that 
state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government 
shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.” 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited by author March 30, 2014).  Thus, both the ICCPR and the 
CERD recognize the need of the United States government to fulfill obligations against 
discrimination, and that certain unspecified laws in existence at the time of ratification of the 
Conventions (in 1992 and 1994, respectively) speak to the United States’ fulfillment of those 
obligations.    
25 Id. (CERD, U.S. Reservations at Ratification, Art. III; ICCPR U.S. Declaration 1). 
26 See e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 357 (Black, J., dissenting), looking at the 
VRA § 5 preclearance requirement: 
… it is hard for me to believe that a justiciable controversy can arise in the constitutional 
sense from a desire by the United States Government or some of its officials to determine 
in advance what legislative provisions a State may enact or what constitutional 
amendments it may adopt.  If this dispute between the Federal Government and the 
States amounts to a case or controversy it is a far cry from the traditional constitutional 
notion of a case or controversy as a dispute over the meaning of enforceable laws or the 
manner in which they are applied. 
27 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) (Dec. 21, 1948). The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights begins with an acknowledgement of the inherent equality of all 
humans, see id. at Art. 1, and includes the right to representation as part of a guarantee of that 
equality: 
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives...The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections, which shall be 207  
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post-World War II, post-colonial statement of the aspirations of positive 
human rights, “no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’ against 
‘non-binding pronouncement,’ but is rather an authoritative statement of the 
international community.” 28  In fact, the decision viewed as persuasive 
commentators who “have concluded that the Universal Declaration has 
become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law.”  The Court 
noted that since the adoption of the U.N. Declarations on Torture and 
Human Rights, “[m]embers can no longer contend that they do not know 
what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote.”29 
 
In looking at the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 30 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,31 the Second Circuit recognized 
that torture violated the Alien Tort Statute32 because it violated the law of 
nations.33   Thus, an undertaking by the United States to comply with the 
law of nations in protecting fundamental rights would give effect to the 
understandings of those rights found in those specific international 
documents.  Again, the Second Circuit’s understanding may have been 
supported by the later ratifications of the ICCPR and CERD that confirmed 
that many of the anti-discrimination principles in those treaties had already 
been put into place under the U.S. Constitution and laws.  While Filartiga 
represented a common sense approach to the intent of Congress to support 
international standards, it may have stood as a high-water mark in this kind 
of positivist domestic interpretation of international civil rights norms.   
 
 
 
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures. 
See id. at Art. 21(1), (3). 
28 Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) citing E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70 (1964). 
29 Id. at 630 F.2d at 883, citing Sohn, A Short History of the United Nations Documents on Human 
Rights, in The United Nations and Human Rights, 18th Report of the Commission (Commission to 
Study the Organization of Peace ed. 1968). 
30 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, adopted Nov. 22, 
1969.  This Convention mirrors the protections of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
with regard to the right to vote.  See id. at Art. 23. 
31 European Union, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, adopted April 11, 1950 (specifically referencing the protections of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights). 
32 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”). 
33 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 208  
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3. The U.S. Supreme Court Regresses 
 
With much of the rest of the world, U.S. courts made definite moves in 
the late 20th century in acknowledging international rights norms and 
obligations, but the early 21st century has thus far given the impression of a 
significant regression.  In 2004, the Supreme Court noted that an 
international declaration like the U.D.H.R. “does not of its own force impose 
obligations as a matter of international law,” citing Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
comment as the U.S. representative to the drafting of the U.D.H.R., calling it 
“a statement of principles … setting up a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations … not a treaty or international agreement 
impos[ing] legal obligations.”34 
 
The Supreme Court moved further from international standards in the 
2008 Medellín decision,35 in which the Court found that the United States 
was not bound by a decision of the International Court of Justice where a 
defendant Mexican national was sentenced to death without having been 
provided an opportunity to talk with the Mexican consulate, notwithstanding 
that the United States had ratified a treaty in 1969 36 recognizing that right.  
The Supreme Court found that “the U.N. Charter reads like ‘a compact 
between independent nations’ that ‘depends for the enforcement of its 
provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties 
to it.’” 37   Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Medellín looks to its own 
understanding of the text, and eschews a “multifactor, ‘context-specific’ 
inquiry” that would sometimes recognize a treaty as self-executing (requiring 
no further legislative action by Congress to allow U.S. courts to enforce the 
treaty’s terms), and sometimes not.38 
 
Writing in dissent for three justices in Medellín, Justice Breyer 
explains a different treatment of treaties: “The Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause provides that ‘all Treaties … which shall be made … under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.’ Art. VI, cl. 2. The Clause 
means that the ‘courts’ must regard ‘a treaty … as equivalent to an act of the 
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative 
34 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004). 
35 Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008). 
36 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 
6820 [596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1967)]. 
37 Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1358-59, citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598, 5 S.Ct. 
247, 28 L.Ed. 798 (1884). 
38 Id. 209  
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provision.’”39 In the context, then, of a United States undertaking to follow a 
decision of the International Court of Justice pursuant to the Charter of the 
United Nations, Congress would have authorized recognition of a U.S. 
obligation, absent a clear enactment to the contrary.  After explaining seven 
substantive reasons for that opinion, the dissent states: “The majority 
reaches a different conclusion because it looks for the wrong thing (explicit 
textual expression about self-execution) using the wrong standard (clarity) in 
the wrong place (the treaty language).”40 It is this burden shifting – this 
requirement of clarity in the adoption of standards by Congress – that leaves 
plaintiffs without the ability to rely on either the tacit or, at times, explicit 
reasoning of Congress, as the Court requires clear and explicit textual 
expression to extend rights. 
 
In Shelby, the same type of burden-shifting used by the conservative 
majority in foreign relations cases to eliminate the U.S. obligation to protect 
rights is used to eviscerate the preclearance requirement of the VRA.  The 
dissent looks to frame the issue in Shelby differently, focusing on the more 
expansive view of rights that is articulated in international instruments and 
was evident in the reasoning in Filartiga.  The dissent41 in Shelby noted that 
Congress had opted to continue the current reading of the Voting Rights Act, 
including its bail out and bail in provisions,42 in part because, “As against the 
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”43  
Under Justice Ginsburg’s rationale, reauthorization will typically satisfy the 
minimal requirements of the rational-basis test, as Congress will have both 
the original record and any additional material before it; that reauthorization 
allows for a review after a period of time; and that the record on review 
should be less stark if the law is working (there should be fewer successful 
incidents of discrimination), and would only be equally stark if the law was 
ineffective. 44  A major deficiency, then, with the Shelby majority opinion is 
that it focuses not on the interpretation of a human right that is part of the 
39 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314, 7 
L.Ed. 415 (1829) (majority opinion of Marshall, C. J.)).   
40 Id. at 1389.   
41 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, 133 S.Ct. 2612 at 
2632. 
42 See Shelby (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), 133 S.Ct. 2612 at 2644, noting that “[t]he VRA permits a 
jurisdiction to bail out by showing that it has complied with the Act for ten years, and has 
engaged in efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of voters,” while other jurisdictions 
that were not previously covered might be bailed in – subjected to federal preclearance 
requirements – “upon finding that violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have 
occurred there.” 
43 See Shelby, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301, 324 (1966)).   
44 Id. at 2632. 210  
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treaty laws of the United States, and therefore “the supreme Law of the 
Land” under the Constitution,45 but instead focuses on the appropriateness of 
Congressional action under the Necessary and Proper Clause following the 
formulation in McCulloch v. Maryland:46  
 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.47 
 
Having thus quoted Chief Justice Marshall, the majority and the 
dissent in Shelby (through the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Ginsburg, respectively) re-engage an historical discussion on the 
representative purpose of government, and a return to that which is ordinary 
in our representative democracy in place of the extraordinary.  As with its 
turn from an expanded recognition of human rights, the Court has also 
turned from an expansion of the protection of the individual at the expense of 
the State or those in power.48  It is in this light that Justice Roberts’ elision of 
the Tenth Amendment—all powers not specifically granted to the Federal 
Government are reserved to the States or citizens49—should be read.  The 
recognition of citizenship derives, in some sense, from the State or those in 
power who have given authority for the individual’s recognition as a 
component of the polity.50  The Tenth Amendment, therefore, protects the 
individual and individual freedom from Federal encroachment, but must do 
45 U.S. Const., Art. VI, par. 2.  “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  One might also look at the Constitutional guarantee that every state shall 
have a republican form of government (U.S. CONST., ART. IV, § 4) (see e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 229-30 (1962), for the proposition that the political question of a state form of government, 
typically preventing justiciability, may not arise where a state government manipulates 
municipal boundaries to deprive a citizen of the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote (citing 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (“ Legislative control of municipalities, no less 
than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States 
Constitution.”)).  
46 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). 
47 Id. 
48 Justice Taney stated in the Dred Scott decision that those whose ancestors were “negroes of the 
African race … imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves … had no rights or 
privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant 
them.”  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393, 403-05 (1857).  The clearest reading of such a clause suggests 
that those holding power are the “sovereign people,” and constituents of the sovereignty of the 
United States; the defining of those “citizens” specifically excludes those descended from African 
slaves.   
49 Shelby, 133 S.Ct 2612. 
50 See Dred Scott, supra note 14. 211  
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so in treating each State in the same way – assuming the State is the 
repository of individual freedom. 
 
Let us assume, therefore, that the right to vote was specifically 
incorporated through the Fifteenth Amendment to apply to all citizens; that 
the Constitution recognizes the particular concern for the previous 
disenfranchisement of those frozen out of the polity of the United States, 
specifically through the violation of State political mechanisms;51 and that 
the United States Congress has recognized a continued concern for the 
disenfranchisement of populations within political districts that have 
historically discriminated against those considered outside of the 
Constitution’s intended polity.  Under that set of assumptions, the VRA 
should clearly stand.   
 
However, the Roberts majority considers legislation from the opposite 
perspective: in order for the Court to enter a judgment upholding the VRA, 
the government must show that Congress specifically provided that right to 
the party, and that the right is not somehow created by the Court. 52  
Congress must only grant those rights where they are constitutional – both 
legitimate and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.53  The 
legislature may not grant rights that violate the constitution, including the 
“constitutional equality of the States … essential to the harmonious 
operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.”54  To the 
extent, then, that Congress violates the equality of States, Congress must 
show why “‘legislative measures not otherwise appropriate’ could be justified 
51 One might note in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Attorney General made clear that the 
history of voting in South Carolina was of concern specifically looking at actions taken in 1878 
and 1882 (among other times) by the State to limit the rights of African-Americans to vote, 84 and 
88 years prior to arguments before the Supreme Court in 1966, and that the South Carolina 
Constitution of 1895, whose “one object” was “[t]he elimination of the negro from politics as 
effectively as this could be accomplished by constitutional enactment” was 73 years before the 
argument in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Brief for the 
Defendant, 1966 WL 100406, at 16-19.  
52 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 at 725, for the proposition that recognition of 
international standards should not be expanded by courts in noting that Holmes explained 
famously in 1881 that “‘in substance the growth of the law is legislative . . . [because t]he very 
considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root 
from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is 
expedient for the community concerned.’. The Common Law 31.32 (Howe ed. 1963).” 
53 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
326 (1966) (citing McCulloch); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 113 S.Ct. 2612 at 2632 (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting). 
54 See Shelby 133 S. Ct. at 2616, slip op. at 11, ignoring the Katzenbach decision’s recognition that 
the doctrine of equality of States “applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the 
Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”  Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. at 328-29. 212  
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by ‘exceptional conditions.’” 55   In looking to the appropriateness of the 
Congressional response to the on-going problem of voting discrimination, the 
Shelby dissent points to the admitted continuing problem of voting 
discrimination;56 the record of DOJ objections blocking 700 voting changes 
that were discriminatory between 1982 and 2006;57 the determination below 
that in fact an “‘extensive record’ support[ed] Congress’ determination that 
‘serious and widespread intentional discrimination persisted in covered 
jurisdictions;’” 58  and that “Congress was satisfied that the VRA’s bailout 
mechanism provided an effective means of adjusting the VRA’s coverage over 
time.”59   
 
Notwithstanding the intent of the Voting Rights Act, the Congressional 
record cited by the dissent, and the reasonable inferences that might be used 
to enforce the Voting Rights Act as necessary and proper even without 
Congressional fact-finding to that effect, the dissent could likely borrow from 
the Medellin decision to note the reason for the Shelby majority’s disquiet: 
“The majority reaches a different conclusion because it looks for the wrong 
thing (explicit textual expression about [the continuation of first generation 
barriers to voting]) using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the 
… language [of the Voting Rights Act]).”  The provisions of the VRA have 
been utilized to deal with devices to prevent the effective use of the voting 
franchise, as “access to the ballot” does not assure representation of 
individuals previously excluded.60  The formalism of the Court creates in 
almost insurmountable standard preventing the application of the intent of 
Congress.  The specificity of Congressional intent must be unmistakable; the 
wrong to be remedied must be extraordinary; and the constitutional right of 
the State to equal treatment—a right not dispositive in prior voting rights 
cases—may not be ignored. 
 
55 Shelby, 113 S.Ct 2612 at 2616. 
56 Shelby, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), slip op. at 1, citing the majority decision, slip op. at 2. 
57 Shelby, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), Id. at 2635. 
58 Shelby, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), Id. at 2636, citing the D.C. Circuit Court’s determinations in 
Shelby, 679 F.3d 848, 865-73 (CADC 2012). 
59 Shelby, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), Id. at 2644, citing the Congressional Record, H.R. Rep. No. 
109-478, at 25. 
60 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-47 (1982) (referencing “electoral devices, such as at-
large elections” as “schemes [that] may operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of 
racial minorities in the voting population.” (internal quotations omitted)).  The Voting Rights Act 
may have created a formula originally looking at issues such as literacy tests and access to the 
ballot, but the Katzenbach Court found it “irrelevant that the coverage formula excludes certain 
localities which do not employ voting tests and devices but for which there is evidence of voting 
discrimination by other means.”  383 U.S. at 330-31.  Even assuming different treatment for 
various jurisdictions, “[l]egislation need not deal with all phases of a problem in the same way, so 
long as the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical experience.”  Id. at 331. 213  
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The VRA has, over time, developed a multi-faceted, context-specific 
analysis to look to the substantive right of persons to vote, in a manner that 
might disturb a textualist.  As in Medellin, one might be concerned that “a 
multifactor, judgment-by-judgment analysis … would jettison relative 
predictability for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors.”61 
 
An international analysis of voting rights calls for—in fact, requires—
just such a “rough-and-tumble of factors.”  There are strong arguments that 
the international provisions recognizing a need for the United States to 
protect and expand the franchise are already national law.62  Even if the 
international obligation has not been enacted through Congress, U.S. 
jurisprudence has long required that, where possible, Congressional 
enactments should be interpreted so as not to violate international law.63  
International agreements (i.e., treaties) may recognize that the United States 
already meets its obligations in preventing discrimination under the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States; treaties recognizing a need to 
extend voting rights to minorities previously discriminated against effectively 
do just that.  
 
Notwithstanding the confluence of international obligations and 
domestic legislation, Congress and the courts may recognize that treaties are 
not self-executing, and that courts may not enforce the terms of the treaty 
without an act of Congress. 64   This would prevent the judiciary’s 
interpretation of a treaty that is not specifically self-executing, and thus 
preclude the issuance of a “blank check” to the judiciary to apply what laws it 
will.65  While the Senate has called for Congressional action to make the 
ICCPR and CERD enforceable, Congress has already acted to extend the 
franchise, such that no blank check is necessary.  The Court has engaged in 
its own rough-and-tumble constitutional analysis in selecting what aspects of 
the Voting Rights Act are necessary, and which aspects are extraordinary, 
going beyond the explicit authority of Congress to craft laws necessary and 
proper.  The Shelby majority has applied a clarity standard comparable to 
that used to limit the application of international law to limit the extent of 
61 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1362 (internal quotes omitted). 
62 Indeed, some amici curiae referenced the ICCPR and CERD in seeking protection of the 
franchise.  See e.g., Brief for the National Lawyers Guild in Support of Respondents at 9-14, 
Shelby Cnty v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. June 25, 2013). 
63 See Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804), “an act of Congress ought never to 
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains….”   
64 See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1362 (2008), where Chief Justice Roberts states that the 
Constitution allows for treaties to be enforceable not by judicial decision, but through the process 
of the political branches making them law as recognized by the U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 7: “that 
treaties could create federal law, but again through the political branches, with the President 
making the treaty and the Senate approving it.” 
65 Id. 214  
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the Voting Rights Act, noting that the dissent’s reliance on “second 
generation barriers” in voting dilution “highlights the irrationality of 
continued reliance on the [VRA] § 4 coverage formula, which is based on 
voting tests and access to the ballot, not vote dilution.”66  However, such a 
test evidences an inconsistency in dismissing deference to Congressional 
findings under the VRA, and demanding Congressional authority for 
application of international standards. 
II. Conclusion 
The Shelby majority’s limiting the application of the Voting Rights Act 
should be a disappointment to rights advocates: by creating a majoritarian 
right in States to decide how States allow for suffrage (until such time as 
Congress extends equal protection to each State government), the decision 
undermines the purpose of the Act, and goes against the purpose-based and 
rights-expanding findings in Katzenbach and Gingles.  The decision also 
undermines past moves toward the protection of fundamental norms 
recognized in Filartiga, and violates treaty rights inuring to the individual, 
found in the ICCPR and CERD.  However, the Court’s recent trajectory 
evidences a consistently heightened burden of proof before extending rights 
guarantees at the expense of government actions.  As this essay argues, the 
heightened burden for the provision of positive rights not only contradicts 
U.S. precedent, it creates an international violation of fundamental rights.  
Perhaps, then, the promise of “relative predictability” has shortcomings; but, 
absent clear Congressional statements on the protection of human rights in 
the face of potential majoritarian backlash, the Shelby decision promises such 
predictability for years. 
66 Shelby, 133 S.Ct. 2612 at 2629. 215  
                                                        
